Abstract. Existing work on data collection and analysis for aggregation is mainly focused on confidentiality issues. That is, the untrusted Aggregator learns only the aggregation result without divulging individual data inputs. In this paper we extend the existing models with stronger security requirements. Apart from the privacy requirements with respect to the individual inputs, we ask for unforgeability for the aggregate result. We first define the new security requirements of the model. We also instantiate a protocol for private and unforgeable aggregation for multiple independent users. I.e, multiple unsynchronized users owing to personal sensitive information without interacting with each other, contribute their values in a secure way: The Aggregator learns the result of a function without learning individual values, and moreover, it constructs a proof that is forwarded to a verifier that will convince the latter for the correctness of the computation. Our protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model.
Introduction
With the advent of the Big Data era, research on privacy preserving data collection and analysis is culminating. Users continuously produce data that can be considered as valuable whenever an Aggregator is interested in aggregating users' data. We therefore consider a scenario whereby an Aggregator collects individual data from multiple users who do not interact with each other and executes a function which outputs an aggregate value. This result is further forwarded to the Data Analyzer who can finally extract useful information about the entire population. Various motivating examples under for the aforementioned generic scenario exist in the real-world:
-The analysis of different user profiles and the derivation of statistics can help recommendation engines provide targeted advertisements. In such scenarios a service provider would collect data from each individual user (i.e: on-line purchases), thus acting as an Aggregator, and compute an on-demand aggregate value upon receiving a request from the advertisement company. The latter will further infer some statistics acting as a Data Analyzer, in order to send the appropriate advertisements to each category of users. -Data aggregation is a promising tool in the field of healthcare research. Different types of data, sensed by body sensors (eg. blood pressure), are collected in large scale in data enclaves who can be considered as Aggregators. Health scientists who act as Data Analyzers are interested in inferring some statistical information from these data without having access to each individual input (for privacy and performance reasons). An aggregate value computed over a large population would give very useful information for deriving statistical models, evaluating therapeutic performance or learning the likelihood of upcoming patients' diseases.
Unfortunately, existing solutions only focus on the problem of data confidentiality and consider the Aggregator to be honest-but-curious: the Aggregator is curious in discovering the content of each individual data, but performs the aggregation operation correctly. In this paper we consider a more powerful security model and assume that the Aggregator is untrusted : The Aggregator may provide a bogus aggregate value to the Data Analyzer. In order to protect against such a malicious behavior, we propose that along with the aggregate value, the Aggregator provides a proof of the correctness of the computation of the aggregate result.
The underlying idea of our solution is that each user encrypts its data according to Shi et al. [15] scheme using its own secret encryption key, and sends the resulting ciphertext to the untrusted Aggregator. Users, also homomorphically tag their data using two layers of randomness with two different keys and they forward the tags to the Aggregator. The latter computes the sum by applying operations on the ciphertexts and it also computes a proof for the correctness of the result from the tags. The Aggregator finally sends the result and the proof to the Data Analyzer. The latter verifies the correctness of the computation. We also require the Data Analyzer not to be able to communicate with each user and the result to be publicly verifiable. Moreover, similarly to the existing solutions, the proposed protocol assures obliviousness against the Aggregator and the Data Analyzer in the multi-user setting; meaning that neither the Data Analyzer nor the Aggregator learns individual data inputs.
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to define a model for Privacy and Unforgeability for Data Aggregation (PUDA). We also instantiate a PUDA scheme which mainly pursues the following three objectives:
-Multi-user setting where multiple users produce personal sensitive data without interacting with each other. -Public verifiability of the aggregate value.
-Privacy of individual data for all participants.
Problem Statement
We are envisioning a scenario whereby a set of users U = {U i } n i=1 are producing sensitive data inputs x i,t at each time interval t. These individual data are first encrypted into ciphertexts c i,t and further forwarded to an untrusted Aggregator A. Aggregator A aggregates all the received ciphertexts, decrypts the aggregate and forwards the resulting plaintext to a Data Analyzer DA together with a cryptographic proof that assures the correctness of the aggregation operation, which in this paper corresponds to the sum of the users' individual data. An important criterion that we aim to fulfill in this paper is to ensure that Data Analyzer DA verifies the correctness of the Aggregator's output without compromising users' privacy. Namely, at the end of the verification operation, both Aggregator A and Data Analyzer DA learn nothing, but the value of the aggregation.
While homomorphic signatures proposed in [4, 10] seem to answer the verifiability requirement, authors in those papers only consider scenarios where a single user generates data.
In the aim of assuring both individual user's privacy and unforgeable aggregation, we first come up with a generic model for privacy preserving and unforgeable aggregation that identifies the algorithms necessary to implement such functionalities and defines the corresponding privacy and security models. Furthermore, we propose a concrete solution which combines an already existing privacy preserving aggregation scheme [15] with an additively homomorphic tag designed for bilinear groups.
Notably, a scheme that allows a malicious Aggregator to compute the sum of users' data in privacy preserving manner and to produce a proof of correct aggregation will start by first running a setup phase. During setup, each user receives a secret key that will be used to encrypt the user's private input and to generate the corresponding authentication tag; the Aggregator A and the Data Analyzer DA on the other hand, are provided with a secret decryption key and a public verification key, respectively. After the key distribution, each user sends its data encrypted and authenticated to Aggregator A, while making sure that the computed ciphertext and the matching authentication tag leak no information about its private input. On receiving users' data, Aggregator A first aggregates the received ciphertexts and decrypts the sum using its decryption key, then uses the received authentication tags to produce a proof that demonstrates the correctness of the decrypted sum. Finally, Data Analyzer DA verifies the correctness of the aggregation, thanks to the public verification key.
PUDA Model
A PUDA scheme consists of the following algorithms:
It is a randomized algorithm run by a trusted dealer KD, which on input of a security parameter κ outputs the public parameters P that will be used by subsequent algorithms, the Aggregator A's secret key SK A , the secret keys SK i of users U i and the public verification key VK.
-EncTag(t, SK i , x i,t ) → (c i,t , σ i,t ): It is a randomized algorithm which on inputs of time interval t, secret key SK i of user U i and data x i,t , encrypts x i,t to get a ciphertext c i,t and computes a tag σ i,t that authenticates
It is a deterministic algorithm run by the Aggregator A. It takes as inputs Aggregator A's secret key SK A , ciphertexts {c i,t } Ui∈U and authentication tags {σ i,t } Ui∈U , and outputs in cleartext the sum sum t of the values {x i,t } Ui∈U . Moreover, it computes a proof σ t assessing the correctness of sum t , using the authentication tags {σ i,t } Ui∈U . -Verify(VK, sum t , σ t ) → {0, 1}: It is a deterministic algorithm that is executed by the Data Analyzer DA. It outputs 1 if Data Analyzer DA is convinced that the sum sum t = Ui∈U {x i,t }; and 0 otherwise.
Security Model
In this paper, we only focus on the adversarial behavior of Aggregator A. The rationale behind this is that Aggregator A is the only party in the protocol that sees all the messages exchanged during the protocol execution: Namely, Aggregator A has access to users' ciphertexts and it is the party that interacts directly with the Data Analyzer. It follows that by ensuring security properties against the Aggregator, one by the same token, ensures these security properties against both Data Analyzer DA and external parties.
In accordance with previous work [11, 15] , we formalize the property of Aggregator obliviousness, which ensures that at the end of a protocol execution, Aggregator A only learns the sum of users' inputs x i,t and nothing else. Also, we enhance the security definitions of data aggregation with the notion of aggregate unforgeability. As the name implies, aggregate unforgeability guarantees that Aggregator A cannot forge a valid proof σ t for a sum sum t that was not computed correctly from users' inputs (i.e. cannot generate a proof for sum t = x i,t ).
Aggregator Obliviousness Aggregator obliviousness ensures that when users U i provide Aggregator A with ciphertexts c i,t and authentication tags σ i,t , Aggregator A cannot reveal any information about individual inputs x i,t , other than the sum value x i,t . We extend the existing definition of Aggregator Obliviousness (cf. [11, 12, 15] ) so as to capture the fact that Aggregator A not only has access to ciphertexts c i,t , but also has access to the authentication tags σ i,t that enable Aggregator A to generate proofs of correct aggregation.
Similarly to the work of [11, 15] , we formalize Aggregator obliviousness using an indistinguishability-based game in which Aggregator A accesses the following oracles: Aggregator A is accessing the aforementioned oracles during a learning phase (cf. Algorithm 1) and a challenge phase (cf. Algorithm 2). In the learning phase, A calls oracle O Setup which in turn returns the public parameters P, the public verification key VK and the Aggregator 's secret key SK A . It also interacts with oracle O Corrupt to learn the secret keys SK i of users U i , and oracle O EncTag to get a set of ciphertexts c i,t and authentication tags σ i,t .
In the challenge phase, Aggregator A chooses a subset S * of users that were not corrupted in the learning phase, and a challenge time interval t * for which it did not make an encryption query. Oracle O AO then receives two time-series X 0 
Algorithm 2: Challenge phase of the obliviousness game
Definition 1 (Aggregator Obliviousness). Let Pr[A AO ] denote the probability that Aggregator A outputs b * = b. Then an aggregation protocol is said to ensure Aggregator obliviousness if for any polynomially bounded Aggregator A the probability
where is a negligible function and κ is the security parameter.
Aggregate Unforgeability We augment the security requirements of data aggregation with the requirement of aggregate unforgeability. More precisely, we assume that Aggregator A is not only interested in compromising the privacy of users participating in the data aggregation protocol, but also interested in tampering with the sum of users' inputs. That is, Aggregator A may sometimes have an incentive to feed Data Analyzer DA erroneous sums. Along these lines, we define aggregate unforgeability as the security feature that ensures that Aggregator A cannot convince Data Analyzer DA to accept a bogus sum, as long as users U i in the system are honest (i.e. they always submit their correct input and do not collude with the Aggregator A).
In compliance with previous work [7, 10] on homomorphic signatures, we formalize aggregate unforgeability via a game in which Aggregator A accesses oracles O Setup and O EncTag . Furthermore, given the property that anyone holding the public verification key VK can execute the algorithm Verify, we assume that Aggregator A during the unforgeability game runs the algorithm Verify by itself.
As shown in Algorithm 3, Aggregator A enters the aggregate unforgeability game by querying the oracle O Setup with a security parameter κ. Oracle O Setup accordingly Algorithm 3: Learning phase of the aggregate unforgeability game ] denote the probability that Aggregator A wins the aggregate unforgeability game, that is, the probability that Aggregator A outputs a Type I Forgery or Type II Forgery that will be accepted by algorithm Verify.
An aggregation protocol is said to ensure aggregate unforgeability if for any polynomially bounded adversary A, Pr[A AU ] (κ), where is a negligible function in the security parameter κ.
Idea of our PUDA protocol
In an extended model with an untrusted Aggregator, it is of utmost importance to design a solution in which the untrusted Aggregator cannot provide bogus results to the Data Analyzer. Such a solution will use a proof system that enables the Data Analyzer to verify the correctness of the computation. Yet verifiability should be achieved without sacrificing privacy. Towards this goal, we propose a protocol that relies on the following techniques:
-A homomorphic encryption algorithm that allows the Aggregator to compute the sum without divulging individual data. -A homomorphic tag that allows each user to authenticate the data input x i,t , in such a way that the Aggregator can use the collected tags to construct a proof that demonstrates to the Data Analyzer DA the correctness of the Aggregator sum.
Concisely, a set of non-interacting users are connected to personal services and devices that produce personal data. Without any coordination, each user chooses a random tag key tk i and sends an encoding thereof, tk i to the key dealer. After collecting all encoded keys tk i by users, the key dealer publishes the public verification key VK of this group of users. This verification key is computed as a function of the encodings tk i . Later, the key dealer gives to each user in the system an encryption key ek i that will be used to compute the user's ciphertexts. Accordingly, the secret key of each user SK i is defined as the pair of tag key tk i and encryption key ek i . Finally, the key dealer provides the Aggregator with secret key SK A computed as the sum of encryption keys ek i and goes off-line. Now at each time interval t, each user employs its secret key SK i to compute a ciphertext based on the encryption algorithm of Shi et al. [15] and a homomorphic tag on its sensitive data input. When the Aggregator collects the ciphertexts and the tags from all users, it computes the sum sum t of users' data and a proof σ t for the sum, and forwards the sum and the proof to the Data Analyzer. At the final step of the protocol, the Data Analyzer verifies with the verification key VK and proof σ t the validity of the result sum t . Although the modification seems straightforward, the proof for Type II Forgery turns out to be challenging.
Thanks to the homomorphic encryption algorithm of Shi et al. [15] and the way in which we construct our homomorphic tags, we show that our protocol ensures Aggregator obliviousness. Moreover, we show that the Aggregator cannot forge bogus results. Finally, we note that the Data Analyzer DA does not keep any state with respect to users' transcripts be they ciphertexts or tags, but it only holds the public verification key, the sum sum t and the proof σ t .
PUDA Instantiation
Let G 1 , G 2 , G T be cyclic groups of large prime order p and g 1 , g 2 generators of G 1 , G 2 accordingly. We say that e is a bilinear map, if the following properties are satisfied:
For encryption and sum computation we employ the discrete logarithm based encryption scheme of Shi et al. [15] :
Let G 1 be a group of large prime order p. A trusted key dealer KD selects a hash function H : {0, 1} * → G 1 . Furthermore, KD selects secret encryption keys ek i ∈ Z p , uniformly at random. KD distributes to each user U i the secret key ek i and it also sends the secret key sk A = − n i=1 ek i to the Aggregator. -Encrypt(ek i , x i,t ): Each user U i encrypts the value x i,t by using its secret encryption key ek i and outputs the corresponding ciphertext c i,
, the Aggregator computes:
PUDA Scheme
In what follows we describe our PUDA protocol:
respectively and p is a prime number that denotes the order of all the groups G 1 , G 2 and G T . Moreover a secret key a is selected by KD. Each U i selects a random tag key tk i ∈ Z p independently and forwards g . After publishing the public parameters P = (H, p, g 1 , g 2 , G 1 , G 2 , G T ) and the verification key VK, KD goes off-line and it does not further participate in any protocol phase.
-EncTag(t, SK i = (ek i , tk i , g a 1 ), x i,t ): At each time interval t each user U i encrypts the data value x i,t with its secret encryption key ek i , using the encryption algorithm, described in section 4.1, which results in a ciphertext
U i also constructs a tag σ i,t ∈ G 1 with its secret tag key (tk i , g a 1 ):
x i,t by using the Aggregate algorithm presented in section 4.1. Moreover, A aggregates the corresponding tags as follows:
xi,t
A finally forwards sum t and σ t to data analyzer DA.
-Verify(VK, sum t , σ t ): During the verification phase DA verifies the correctness of the computation with the verification key VK = ( Proof. Assume there is an aggregator A which breaks the obliviousness of the PUDA scheme with a non-negligible advantage . We build in what follows an adversary B who uses A as a subroutine to break the aggregator obliviousness of the private streaming aggregation (PSA) protocol presented in [15] , which is guaranteed under DDH. Without loss of generality we call the oracles that the adversary B has access to from the PSA scheme as follows: O , g 1 , g 2 , G 1 , G 2 , G T ) . B chooses uniformly at random a, {r i } Ui∈U such and defines the verification key VK as follows:
This entails that tk i is defined as: aek i + r i . Finally B forwards to A the public parameters:P = (H, p, g 1 , g 2 
and the secret key of the Aggregator sk A .
Whenever A calls oracle O Corrupt with a user's identifier uid i , B relays the query uid i to O PSA Corrupt of the PSA scheme which in turns outputs the secret encryption key ek i of user U i . B then returns secret key SK i = (ek i , tk i ) = (ek i , aek i + r i ).
Whenever A calls oracle O EncTag with query (t, uid i , x i,t ), B forwards the query to the O PSA Encrypt oracle which returns the appropriate ciphertext c i,t = H(t) ek i g xi,t
1 . B computes then the tag associated with ciphertext c i,t as
and transmits to A ciphertext c i,t and tag σ i,t . Challenge phase: In the challenge phase A chooses a set of users S * that have not been corrupted during the learning phase and a time interval t * for which A did not make a query to oracle O EncTag . A then submits two time-series 
Note that σ 
It follows that if aggregator A is able to output a correct guess b * for the bit b with a non-negligible advantage : (i.e. is able to break the aggregator obliviousness of our scheme), then B will break the aggregator obliviousness of the PSA scheme with the same non-negligible advantage by outputting the guess b * .
As such PSA scheme ensures aggregator obliviousness under the DDH assumption in G 1 , we can conclude that our scheme also ensures aggregator obliviousness:
2 + (κ) as long as DDH holds in G 1 .
Aggregate Unforgeability
We first introduce a new assumption that is used during the security analysis of our PUDA instantiation. Our new assumption named hereafter as LEOM is a variant of the LRSW assumption [14] which is proven secure in the generic model [16] and it used for the construction of the CL signatures [5] . W.l.g we assume a set I of size n and an index t.
, ∀i ∈ I, δ ∈ Z p uniformly and at random which are kept secret. It also gives the public key (g n i=1 γi 2 , g δ 2 ) to the adversary and chooses α ∈ G 1 at random. Adversary makes bulk queries (i, t, {x i,t } n i=1 ), ∀i ∈ I and the O LEOM oracle, chooses β t ∈ Z p uniformly and at random and replies with
for each different t. O LEOM aborts if it receives a bulk query for a t for which there is i ∈ I : i = i for which x i,t = x i,t . In the end the adversary succeeds if it outputs a tuple (t, z, α, β t , β
Theorem 2. (LEOM Assumption) Let G be an algorithm that on input the security parameter κ outputs the parameters of a bilinear group G = (e, G 1 ,
Then for all probabilistic polynomial time adversaries A the probability:
Due to space limitations, the security evidence of the LEOM is deferred in the Appendix section.
We show in our analysis that a Type I Forgery implies a break of the BCDH assumption and next that a Type II Forgery implies a break of the LEOM assumption. Theorem 3. Our scheme achieves aggregate unforgeability against a Type I Forgery under BCDH assumption in the random oracle model. Proof. We show how to build an attacker B that solves BCDH in (G 1 , G 2 , G T ). Let g 1 and g 2 be two generators for G 1 and G 2 respectively. B receives the chal-
from the BCDH oracle O BCDH and is asked to output e(g 1 , g 2 ) abc ∈ G T . B simulates the interaction with A in the two phases (Setup, Learning) as follows: Setup:
∈ Z p and outputs the public parameters P = (κ, p, g 1 , g 2 
and the secret key of the Aggregator
Learning phase -A is allowed to query the random oracle H for any time interval . B constructs a H − list and responds to A query as follows: 1. If query (t) already appears in a tuple H-tuple t : r t , coin(t), H(t) of the H − list it responds to A with H(t). 2. Otherwise it selects a random number r t ∈ Z p and flips a random coin $ ← {0, 1}. With probability p, coin(t) = 0 and B answers with H(t) = g 
, which is a valid tag for the value x i,t . Notice that B can correctly compute the tag without knowing a and b from the BCDH problem parameters g (f) B chooses also a secret encryption key y i ∈ {y i } n i=1 ∈ Z p and computes the ciphertext as c i,t = H(t) yi g xi,t
1 . The simulation is correct since A can check that the sum n i=1 x i,t corresponds to the ciphertexts given by B with its decryption key SK A = − n i=1 y i , considering the attacker has made distinct encryption queries for all the n users in the scheme at a time interval t. (g) B sets Σ t = Σ t + x i,t and updates the T − list with the tuple: t, uid i , x i,t , σ i,t 2. Else if T − list contains i = uid i and x i,t = x i,t then B fetches the corresponding σ i,t from the list and forwards it to A. 3. Else if T − list contains i = uid i and x i,t = x i,t then B aborts. 4. Otherwise (0 < cnt t < n), B looks to the H − list list for the tuple indexed by t in order to get t : r t , coin(t), H(t) . If the tuple does not exist then B tosses a random coin and if coin(t) = 1 then B aborts. If coin(t) = 0 then B computes the tag identically as in 1(d)(e)(f)(g) steps: It chooses a key k i where i = uid i from the selected keys {k i }. It constructs the tag as σ i,t = g
and the ciphertext as c i,t = H(t) yi g xi,t
1 . Finally B sets Σ t = Σ t + x i,t , updates the T − list with the tuple: t, uid i , x i,t , σ i,t . Now, when B receives the forgery (sum t * , σ t * ) at time interval t = t * , it continues if sum t * = Σ t . B first queries the H-tuple for time t * in order to fetch the appropriate tuple.
-If coin(t * ) = 0 then B aborts.
-If coin(t * ) = 1 then since A outputs a valid forged σ t * at t * , it is true that the following equation should hold:
which is true when A makes n queries for time interval t * for distinct users to the O A EncTag oracle during the Learning phase. As such σ t * = g
Finally B outputs:
Let A AU1 the event when A successfully forges a Type I forgery σ t for our PUDA protocol that happens with some non-negligible probability . Then
, for q H random oracle queries with the probability Pr[coin(t) = 0] = p. As such we ended up in a contradiction assuming the hardness of the BCDH assumption and finally Pr[A AU1 ] ≤ 1 , where 1 is a negligible function. A is able to correctly verify the sum, more precisely:
Therefore, from the point of view of A, the tags σ i,t = β γi t α δxi,t correspond to well formed verifiable tags. Notice that if there is some non-negligible probability that B breaks the LEOM assumption then the probability that A outputs a Type II Forgery is also non-negligible. This leads to a contradiction under the LEOM assumption and accordingly, Pr[A AU2 ] ≤ 2 for a negligible function 2 . We conclude that our scheme guarantees aggregate unforgeability for a Type II Forgery under the LEOM assumption in the random oracle model. Table 1 : Performance of tag computation, proof construction and verification operations. l denotes the bit-size of the prime number p.
To conclude with the analysis the success probabilities for the aggregate unforgeability game Pr[A AU ], are taken over the union of the success probabilities for the two type of forgeries. As such
where 1 and 2 are negligible functions.
Performance Evaluation
In this section we analyze the extra overhead of ensuring the aggregate unforgeability property in our PUDA instantiation scheme. First, we consider a theoretical evaluation with respect to the mathematical operations a participant of the protocol be it user, Aggregator or Data Analyzer has to perform with respect to the verifiability transcripts. That is, the computation of the tag by each user, the proof by the Aggregator and the verification of the proof by the Data Analyzer. We also present an experimental evaluation that shows the practicality of out scheme.
To allow the Data analyzer to verify the correctness of computations performed by an untrusted Aggregator each user selects uniformly and at random a secret key tk i ∈ Z p . The key dealer distributes to each user g a 1 ∈ G 1 and publishes g a 2 ∈ G 2 , which calls for two exponentiations: one in G 1 and one in G 2 . At each time interval t each user computes σ i,t = H(t) tki (g a 1 ) xi,t ∈ G 1 , which entails two exponentiations and one multiplication in G 1 . For the computation of the σ t the Aggregator is involved in n − 1 multiplications in G 1 : n i=1 σ i,t . Finally the data analyzer verifies by checking the equality: e(σ t , g 2 )
?
= e(H(t), vk 1 )e(g sumt 1 , vk 2 ), which asks for three pairing evaluations, one hash in G 1 , one exponentiation in G 1 and one multiplication in G T (see table 1 ). The efficiency of PUDA stems from the constant time verification with respect to the size of the users. This is of crucial importance since the Data Analyzer may not own computational power.
We implemented the verification functionalities of PUDA with the Charm cryptographic framework [1, 2] . For pairing computations, it inherits the PBC [13] library which is also written in C. All of our benchmarks are executed on Intel Core i5 CPU M 560 @ 2.67GHz × 4 with 8GB of memory, running Ubuntu 12.04 32bit. Charm uses 3 types of asymmetric pairings: MNT159, MNT201, MNT224. We run our benchmarks with these three different types of asymmetric pairings. The timings for all the underlying mathematical group operations are summarized in table 3. There is a vast difference on the computation time of operations between G 1 and G 2 for all the different curves. The reason is the fact that the bit-length of elements in G 2 is much larger than in G 1 . As shown in table 2, the computation of tags σ i,t implies a computation overhead at a scale of milliseconds with a gradual increase as the bit size of the underlying elliptic curve increases. The data analyzer is involved in pairing evaluations and computations at the target group independent of the size of the data-users.
Related Work
In [6] , authors proposed a solution which is based on homomorphic message authenticators in order to verify the computation of generic functions on outsourced data. Each data input is authenticated with an authentication tag. A composition of the tags is computed by the cloud in order to verify the correctness of the output of a program P . Thanks to the homomorphic properties of the tags the user can verify the correctness of the program. The main drawback of the solution is that the user in order to verify the correctness of the computation has to be involved in computations that take exactly the same time as the computation of the function f . Backes et al. [3] proposed a generic solution for efficient verification of bounded degree polynomials in time less than the evaluation of f . The solution is based on closed form efficient pseudorandom function P RF . Contrary to our solution both solutions do not provide individual privacy and they are not designed for a multi-user scenario.
Catalano et al. [8] employed a nifty technique to allow single users to verify computations on encrypted data. The idea is to re-randomize the ciphertext and sign it with a homomorphic signature. Computations then are performed on the randomized ciphertext and the original one. However the aggregate value is not allowed to be learnt in cleartext by the untrusted aggregator since the protocols are geared for cloud based scenarios.
In the multi-user setting, Choi et al. [9] proposed a protocol in which multiple users are outsourcing their inputs to an untrusted server along with the definition of a functionality f . The server computes the result in a privacy preserving manner without learning the result and the computation is verified by a user that has contributed to the function input. The users are forced to operate in a non-interactive model, whereby they cannot communicate with each other. The underlying machinery entails a novel proxy based oblivious transfer protocol, which along with a fully homomorphic scheme and garbled circuits allows for verifiability and privacy. However, the need of fully homo-morphic encryption and garbled circuits renders the solution impractical for a real world scenario.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we designed and analyzed a protocol for private and unforgeable aggregation. First we modeled its security and privacy requirements. In this setting a set of trustworthy users submit data coupled with unforgeable tags. The purpose of the protocol is to allow a data analyzer to verify the correctness of computation performed by a malicious Aggregator, without discovering the underlying data. The challenge of the verification in aggregation protocols that we tackled with the PUDA protocol is the fact that the privacy from the authentication tags is guaranteed by multiple independent users. Our PUDA instantiation allows for public verification in constant time and is provably secure under the DDH, BCDH and the new LEOM assumption in bilinear pairing groups in the random oracle model. In what follows we describe how B simulates the groups operations in G 1 , G 2 , G T and the oracle responses to O LEOM . We first assume that before A queries the oracle or asks for group operations it has already asked for the random encodings of the involved elements of the operations. Consequently when A asks for operations in -Pairing: A pairing operation in G T consists of two random encodings ξ 1,i , ξ 2,j with 1 ≤ i ≤ τ 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ τ 2 . B first increments the counter τ T + = 1. Afterwards it computes the pairing as the multiplication of the appropriate polynomials: F T,τ T = F 1,τ1 ·F 2,τ2 . If the same polynomial already exists in L T : F T,τ T = F T,l , 1 ≤ l ≤ τ T then B clones the random string ξ T,l , otherwise it choses a fresh random ξ T,τ T ∈ {0, 1} log 2 q and gives it to A. B finally appends to L T the pair (F T,τ T , ξ T,τ T ). -O LEOM : B increments a counter τ O by 1 and sets τ 1 + = 3. A inputs (u, t, x u,t ). B computes the polynomials F 1,τ1−2 = A t , F 1,τ1−1 = A t (Y ), F 1,τ1 = (BΓ u + A∆X) for the indeterminants B, Γ u , A, ∆, X. If any of the F 1,τ1−2 , F 1,τ1−1 , F 1,τ1 already exist in L 1 then B clones the associated random encodings ξ 1,l for some l ∈ [1, · · · , τ 1 ]. Otherwise it creates three random encodings ξ 1,τ1−2 , ξ 1,τ1−1 , ξ 1,τ1 ∈ {0, 1} log 2 q and forwards them to A. It also stores the pairs (F 1,τ1−2 , ξ 1,τ1−2 ), (F 1,τ1−1 , ξ 1,τ1−1 ), (F 1,τ1 , ξ 1,τ1 ) in L 1 list.
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Eventually A outputs a forgery (m f , ξ 1,f a , ξ 1,f y , ξ 1,f xy ).Let F 1,f a , F 1,f x , F 1,f xy be the corresponding polynomials in L 1 list. If A's forgery is valid then it must hold:
which corresponds to e( c t , g 2 ) − e(β t , g n u=1 γu 2 )e(a n u=1 mu , g δ 2 ) = 0 ∈ G T . We show now that this does not happen always. Indeed w.l.g we have the following form for each polynomial in the three lists:
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